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            NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
   
 
No. 10-1528 
   
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JUSTIN DENNIS, 
                            
    Appellant. 
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D. C. No. 1-09-cr-00270-001) 
District Judge:  Hon. Sylvia H. Rambo 
      
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on November 5, 2010 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, RENDELL and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 20, 2011) 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N 
    
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 Justin Dennis appeals the District Court‟s February 16, 2010, judgment of 
sentence.  Dennis contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable, because the 
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District Court abused its discretion in evaluating his criminal history under the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or the Guidelines).  For the following reasons, we 
will affirm the judgment of sentence. 
I.  Background 
 In the course of investigating crack cocaine distribution in Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania, federal and state law enforcement agents became interested in Dennis.  
During the summer of 2009, agents used confidential informants to purchase crack 
cocaine from Dennis on four different occasions:  one ounce on June 10; seven grams on 
July 10; seven grams on July 29; and fourteen grams on August 11.  Dennis was arrested 
on August 24, 2009.  Dennis subsequently waived his Miranda rights and admitted that 
he had been obtaining and distributing roughly an ounce of crack cocaine per week since 
January 2009. 
 Dennis later consented to a written plea agreement, filed October 9, 2009.  Before 
the District Court, on October 19, 2009, Dennis pleaded guilty to a superseding 
information, which charged him with distributing and possessing, with intent to 
manufacture and distribute, cocaine base (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)).  Although Dennis 
acknowledged his earlier admission that he had been selling crack cocaine since January 
2009, Dennis asserted before the District Court that this admission was inaccurate and 
that he had only been selling since May 2009.   
After Dennis pleaded guilty, the Probation Office prepared the PSR and calculated 
Dennis‟s potential sentencing range under the 2009 Guidelines as 188 to 235 months.   
Based on Dennis‟s previous admission that between January 2009 and his arrest on 
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August 24, 2009 he was buying and distributing approximately one ounce of crack 
cocaine per week, the PSR estimated that Dennis had handled 794 grams of crack 
cocaine.   
Dennis filed three primary objections to the PSR:  (1) that the PSR improperly 
estimated the drug weight Dennis had distributed, as the PSR had relied on Dennis‟s 
allegedly inaccurate admission that he had been selling roughly an ounce of crack 
cocaine per week from January 2009 to the time of his arrest; (2) that the District Court 
should grant a variance based on the sentencing disparity between crack cocaine and 
powder cocaine; and (3), that the District Court should grant a variance because the 
resulting criminal history category overstated the seriousness of Dennis‟s past criminal 
conduct.   
At the sentencing hearing, the District Court reduced the amount of crack cocaine 
to the estimated amount of drugs distributed from May to August.  The court subtracted 
three points for Dennis‟s acceptance of responsibility in entering a guilty plea.  As for 
Dennis‟s criminal history, the court assessed Dennis‟s past convictions and alleged 
criminal conduct on the record and denied his request to reduce his criminal history 
category as it stood in the PSR.  Based on its conclusions, the court assigned an advisory 
guidelines range to Dennis of 151 to 188 months with three years of supervised release. 
The court ultimately decided to depart downward from the Guidelines, and 
imposed a sentence of 140 months, to be followed by three years of supervised release.  
The court explained that it had departed from the Guidelines by one offense level on 
account of the disparate treatment for crack cocaine and powder cocaine under the 
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Guidelines, and “to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among [d]efendants which 
this Court has consistently applied a one-level variance.”   
Dennis appealed. 
II.   Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 3742(a).   
 We review a challenge to the reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse-of-
discretion standard, with certain adjustment for strictly factual or legal conclusions.  
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567-68 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
III.  Discussion 
  “After the Supreme Court‟s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 
(2005), we review sentences for „reasonableness.‟” United States v. Lychock, 578 F.3d 
214, 217 (3d Cir. 2009).  We conduct our review in two stages, considering first the 
procedural reasonableness, and second, the substantive reasonableness of a sentence.  
Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567; see also United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).    
 Dennis does not contest the procedural reasonableness of his sentence.  Rather he 
contends that his sentence was substantively unreasonable for two reasons:  (1) that his 
sentencing range under the Guidelines overstates the seriousness of his criminal history 
and (2) that a subsequent amendment to the Guidelines – the deletion of U.S.S.G. § 
4A1.1(e), a section which added points to the defendant‟s criminal history depending on 
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the recency of certain past criminal conduct – would have lowered his criminal history 
category had it been applied to his sentencing determination.
1
  
Dennis‟s argument that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because his 
Guidelines range, as a qualitative matter, should have amounted to a lesser criminal 
history category is unavailing. The District Court adequately considered the totality of the 
circumstances, including the applicable Guidelines range and the § 3553(a) factors, in 
imposing the sentence.  The District Court noted that Dennis had amassed six drug-
related crimes over a short period of time and had engaged in a broader pattern of 
criminal conduct, which taken together evidenced a “total disregard for the law.”  
Further, the District Court, upon Dennis‟s prompting, recommended that he receive drug 
treatment to deter him from future criminal conduct, and granted a downward departure 
of one offense level based on the disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine 
and to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.  We conclude that the District Court 
imposed a substantively reasonable sentence.
 
 
 Although Dennis asserts in his brief and 28(j) letter that subsequent amendments 
to the Guidelines – in particular the elimination of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e) (recency points) 
and changes made in response to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, PL 111-220, 1234 Stat. 
2372 (Aug. 3, 2010) – might have altered his Guidelines range, we review the “propriety 
                                              
1
  To the extent that Appellant asserts an argument that the District Court should 
have granted a downward departure under § 4A1.3(b) of the Guidelines, we do not have 
jurisdiction to review such discretionary decisions, “unless the record reflects that the 
district court was not aware of or did not understand its discretion to make such a 
departure.”  United States v. Grier, 585 F.3d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 
omitted); see also United States v. Jones, 566 F.3d 353, 368 (3d Cir. 2009).  It is evident 
that the District Court was aware of its discretion to depart from the Guidelines. 
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of a sentence” based on the Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing.  Wise, 515 F.3d 
at 220.  We, therefore, conclude that the sentence the District Court imposed was well 
within its discretion.  
IV.  Conclusion  
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court‟s judgment of 
sentence. 
